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THE RIGHT OF A CREDITOR OF AN HEIR
TO CONTEST THE WILL
I. Introduction
Kazar Harootenian died, leaving his four children as his heirs. An instru-
ment dated four days prior to his death stated that it was his will. The will
expressly disinherited two of his children, left little to a third, and bequeathed
the rest of his estate to his daughter, Agnes. It appeared that Agnes, together
with her disinherited brother George, had persuaded the deceased to sign such
a will in order to obtain most of the estate for themselves. George wished to be
disinherited because he owed money on an unsatisfied judgment against him,
and if he received a share in the estate it would be diminished by the satisfac-
tion of the outstanding judgment. Thus there was apparent collusion between
George and Agnes not only to get most of the estate for themselves but also to
place George's share in the hands of Agnes and out of the reach of his creditor.
Jean Harootenian, George's divorced wife, held the unsatisfied judgment
against him for unpaid support payments. If the will disinheriting George was
valid, he would have no property to satisfy her judgment. However, if the will
was invalid, George would get his intestate share. Jean, therefore, contested
the validity of the will on the ground, inter alia, that the decedent's signature
was procured by the undue influence of George and Agnes.
George and Agnes resisted Jean's contest and insisted that Jean was not
even an appropriate party to the probate proceeding. The applicable probate
code section provided that only an "interested person' may contest a will.
The issue, then, was whether a judgment creditor of a disinherited heir is an
"interested person" within the meaning of the statute and therefore a proper
party to contest the will.
The California Supreme Court in In re Harootenian's Estate2 held that a
judgment creditor of a disinherited heir is an "interested person" within the
meaning of the statute, provided that the creditor has perfected a lien on the
debtor heir's property. In arriving at its decision, the court recognized a distinc-
tion between the right of a general creditor and that of a judgment creditor to
contest a will in a probate proceeding. The court also discussed the necessity
of an "interested" creditor to have perfected a lien on the debtor heir's property.
Is the distinction between a general creditor and a judgment creditor cru-
cial to the issue of standing? Furthermore, must the judgment creditor have
perfected a lien in order to be an "interested person"? Finally, why should any
creditor have the right to contest the probate of a will?3 These questions have
1 CAL. PRon. CODE § 370 (West 1956).
2 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 992 (1951), noted in 27 NoTRE DAmE LAWYER 659 (1952), 4
STAN. L. REv. 607 (1952), 5 VAND. L. REV. 857 (1952).
3 This case provides what is perhaps the best discussion of the various approaches to
this issue. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Shenk and concurred in by Justice
Schauer, held that a judgment creditor who has perfected a lien on the heir's property could
contest the will. A concurring opinion, written by Justice Carter and concurred in by Justice
Traynor, said that any judgment creditor of an heir should be able to contest the will, whether
or not such creditor had perfected a lien. It also said that standing to contest should be
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evoked conflicting decisions.4 At times decisions in this area have been based on
considerations of policy,' but just as often courts have based their decisions upon
a property interest theory.'
This note will discuss the controversy in the context of probate practice
and how the Uniform Probate Code treats the right of a creditor of a disin-
herited heir to challenge the will.8
II. Necessity of the Probate Contest and the Corresponding
Necessity for Limits
Probate today is a legislatively created process whereby special probate
courts adjudicate the external validity or invalidity of wills.' It is necessary to
probate a will since generally that is the exclusive way for a beneficiary to estab-
lish his testamentary rights.10 Legislatures have determined that this probate
decree is in rem, i.e., it is a statement on the validity of a will which is final and
conclusive against the entire world.1
Since a probate decree has this sweeping in rem effect, there should be
some point at which parties with adverse interests can challenge the decree.
Since the legal rights of heirs, beneficiaries, and others are in large part deter-
mined by the probate court's decree, there must be a forum in which to protect
these interests.
The forum is the probate court itself and the time to protect these interests
is generally immediately after the will has been propounded for probate but
before the probate decree has been entered. Most states also allow the decree
granted to a creditor who has brought an action and affected a valid attachment of the
interest of the heir in the estate. A dissenting opinion, written by Justice Edmonds and con-
curred in by Justice Spence, would refuse to any creditor of an heir the right to contest the
will.
4 Cases holding that general creditors of heirs do not have standing are collected infra,
note 22. Cases contra are collected infra, note 30. Cases holding that judgment creditors do
have standing are collected infra, note 36. Cases contra are collected infra, note 46.
5 In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 992 (1951); In re Shepard's
Estate, 170 Pa. 323, 32 A. 1040 (1895).
6 E.g., Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (1926).
7 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1969).
8 On the general right of creditors of heirs to contest the will, see generally, T. ATKIN-
SON, WILLS § 99, at 518 (2nd ed. 1953); 3 W. PAGE, WILLS § 26.60, at 134 (Bowe-Parker ed.
1961); 2 WOERNER, THE AsmEasc LAW OF ADMINISTRATION § 217, p. 716 et seq. (3rd ed.
1923); Kerson, Creditors and the Will Contest, 14 HASTINGS L. REv. 18 (1962); Note, Right
of Persons Claiming Through an Heir to Contest a Will, 27 IOWA L. REv. 443 (1942); 40
CALIF. L. Rav. 449 (1952); 12 CORNELL L. Q. 247 (1927); 27 NoTa DAME LAWYER 659
(1952); 4 STAN. L. R1v. 607 (1952); 5 VsAD. L. Rxv. 857 (1952); 2 WASH. & LEE L. Rv.
166 '(1940); 36 YAtLE L. J. 150 (1926); and the following Annotations: 46 A.L.R. 1490
(1926); 128 A.L.R. 963 (1940).
9 The external validity of the will includes its genuineness, proper execution, testa-
mentary character, and the capacity of the testator.
10 T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 96, at 499 et seq. '(2nd ed. 1953).
11 In the United States, legislatures early adopted an in rem probate proceeding both
as to realty and personalty. See generally, T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 93, at 483 (2nd ed.
1953); 1 W. PAGE, WILLS § 2.18, at 59 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961). For a general discussion of
the in rem nature of a probate proceeding see Simes, The Administration of a Decedent's Estate
as a Proceeding in Rem, 43 MICH. L. Ryv. 675 (1945). The early English probate practice,
however, did not have an in rem probate decree as to realty, and as a result there could be
inconsistent determinations of a will's validity. See T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 93, at 480 et seq.
(2nd ed. 1953); Rls',PY & TomPxms, HISTORY OF WILLS, at 96 et seq. (1928).
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of the probate court to be contested within a limited time after it has been
entered. 2
Just as it is necessary to have a time and place to contest a will, it is neces-
sary to limit those who have the right to contest. This expedites the probate
process and settles estates with the least possible delay and expense. If anyone
were allowed to contest the decree of probate, there would be endless opportunity
for harassment. Consequently, there must be a carefully defined group of proper
parties who may contest the probate of the will.
In formulating this perimeter, the probate codes of most states have at-
tempted to limit those who may challenge the will to "persons aggrieved" or
"persons interested" in the outcome.' Even in the absence of express statutory
limitation, courts themselves have narrowed the field of contestants to "interested
persons.)
14
It is unanimously agreed that a sentimental interest in the disposition of
the estate is not sufficient to render a party "interested." The contestant must
have a direct and immediate pecuniary interest that may either be impaired or
defeated by the probate of the will or be benefitted by setting it aside.'" While
some courts have additionally insisted that the contestant have a legal interest
or recognized legal estate in the property affected by the will,' 6 other courts
have been less stringent on this requirement.'
Certain parties will categorically be construed as "interested persons." A
classic example is the heir or next of kin who has been disinherited or who has
been bequeathed an amount less than his intestate share.' If the will is declared
invalid, the heir will benefit by receiving his full intestate share. In short, all
persons are "interested" who can show that property will go immediately and
directly to them if the will is set aside. Conversely, certain people are held
never to have the "interest" required of a proper party to a will contest. For
example, creditors of the decedent are held not to have standing to contest the
validity of the will, since they are satisfied out of the estate whether there is a
will or not.'
There is, however, no consensus as to whether the personal representative
12 T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 98, at 514-515 (2nd ed. 1953).
13 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 370 (West 1956) provides that "any person interested" can
contest. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-105 provides that "persons interested" may take part
in proceedings. See generally 3 W. PAoE, WILLS § 26.52, at 117 et seq. (Bowe-Parker ed.
1961).
14 E.g., Crawforsville Trust Co. v. Ramsey, 178 Ind. 258, 98 N.E. 177 (1912); In re
Stewart, 107 Iowa 117, 77 N.W. 574 (1898); In re Goldsberry's Estate, 95 Utah 379, 81 P.2d
1106 (1938); W. PAGE, WILLS § 26.52 note 13 supra.
15 E.g., Estate of Land, 166 Cal. 538, 137 P. 246 (1913); In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa
426, 292 N.W. 165 (1940); Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 246 Mo. 711, 152 S.W. 38 (1912);
W. PAGE, WLLS note 13 supra.
16 E.g., Smith v. Bradstreet, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 264 (1834); Lee v. Keech, 151 Md.
34, 133 A. 835 (1926).
17 In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 249, 238 P.2d 992, 996 (1951) says that
"[i]t is not interest in the estate as such which determines his right. It is his interest in the
devolution of the estate which establishes the right to contest."
18 E.g., Marr v. Barnes, 126 Kan. 84, 267 P. 9 (1928); Hilfiker v. Fennig, 224 Ind. 594,
69 N.E.2d 743 (1947). See generally W. PA'GE, WiLLS note 13 supra.
19 Montgomery v. Foster, 91 Ala. 613, 8 So. 349 (1890); Hooks v. Brown, 125 Ga. 122,
53 S.E. 583 (1906).
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of the deceased2" or assignees and grantees of heirs2' may contest a will. This
note will discuss whether the creditor of an heir has standing to contest the pro-
bate of a will.
III. Rights of Creditors of Heirs to Dispute the Will's Validity
A. Rights of General Creditors
Courts have usually held that a general creditor of a disinherited heir does
not have standing to contest the validity of the will in probate court.2 In re
Shepard's Estate23 illustrates the typical manner in which courts have decided
the right of a general creditor to contest. In Shepard the testatrix left a will
bequeathing her property precisely as it would have descended under the laws
of intestate succession except for the exclusion of her son Henry. The one-fourth
interest in the estate that would have been Henry's intestate share was be-
queathed to Henry's wife and children, protecting Henry's share from seizure by
his creditors. The creditors contested probate of the will alleging that the dece-
dent's signature was forged. The issue was narrowed to whether or not Henry's
creditors were "persons interested" as required by statute. 4
The court conceded that a general creditor is interested in his debtor ac-
quiring more property, since the latter's ability to pay and the former's ability
to seize property depend on the value of the debtor's assets. The court decided,
however, that this general interest is not the interest required by statute. The
court considered these creditors' interest too intangible and remote; the even-
tuality of the creditors ever actually satisfying themselves from this property was
too uncertain.2" The court also reasoned that if the creditor is to have standing
as a "party interested," it must be by a theoretical substitution to the right of
the son. Since the creditor claims through the son, he could not contest since his
and the son's interests are antagonistic.2"
20 3 W. PAGE. WILLS § 26.55, at 125 et seq. (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961) and cases collected
therein. Note also that § 1-201(20) of the Uniform Probate Code provides that the term
"interested person" also includes ". . . persons having priority for appointment as personal
representative. ... ." This would seem to clarify this area in those states having adopted the
Code. See also Annot., 31 A.L.R. 2d 756 (1953).
21 3 W. PAGE, WILLS § 26.59, at 133 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961) and cases cited therein.
22 Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996 (1899) (also held that judgment
creditors had no right to contest); San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. App.
675, 10 P.2d 158 (1932); In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 992 (1951);
Keeler v. Lauer, 73 Kan. 388, 85 P. 541 (1906); Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835
(1926) (held also that judgment creditor had no right to contest); Smith v. Bradstreet, 33
Mass. (16 Pick.) 264 (1834); In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429, 47 N.W. 1133 (1891)
(allowed judgment creditors to contest, but not general creditors); Watson v. Alderson, 146
Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478 (1898) (allowed judgment creditors to contest, but not general credi-
tors); Bank of Tennessee v. Nelson, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 426 (1859) (also held that judgment
creditors had no right to contest).
23 170 Pa. 323, 32 A. 1040 (1895).
24 Id. at 326, 32 A. at 1040.
25 Id. at 327, 32 A. at 1041. See also, on the remoteness of the interest of a creditor of
an heir, Judge Edmond's dissenting opinion in In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 255,
238 P.2d 992, 999 (1951) wherein he says that ". . . if the contest is successful, and if the
real estate distributable to the debtor has not been sold during administration, and if that real
estate is finally distributed to the debtor, the creditor then will have a property interest in the
estate of the decedent." '(Emphasis in original.)
26 In re Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. at 327, 32 A. at 1041 (1895).
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Policy considerations were perhaps the real basis of the court's decision in
Shepard. Allowing the statute to include creditors of heirs within its definition
of "interested parties" would be to "... invite every disappointed creditor of
every heir and legatee to contest the will of a parent who has attempted to pro-
vide for those dependent for subsistence on a thriftless son."2 These words sug-
gest that the unique facts in Shepard may have shaped the court's decision.
They also suggest that the court was concerned about a deluge of similar liti-
gation if every creditor of every heir were allowed to contest. Extended litigation
obviously could tie up large estates on behalf of a creditor whose claim may be
inconsequential.2"
The earliest American case deciding the issue, Smith v. Bradstreet,2" indi-
cated that the reason a general creditor did not have standing to contest was
that, inter alia, he did not have a requisite property interest in the estate. To
have standing, the court said, the decree rejecting or allowing probate must
give or divest some right to property of the contestant.
Although the general rule is that general creditors of heirs cannot contest
the will, at least one jurisdiction has granted them standing.3" In Brooks v.
Paine's Ex'rs,3' the testator had left a will which bequeathed the bulk of his
estate to his sons' children, and only a small part of it to his sons. The sons
acquiesced in the bequest, but their creditors, some of whom were general cred-
itors, wished to contest the will on the grounds that the testator revoked it be-
fore his death. The question was whether a creditor of an heir can contest a
will which disinherits the heir.32
The court held the creditor to be a proper party. First, probate of the will
is a conclusive in rem proceeding and cannot be collaterally attacked. Disin-
herited heirs could acquiesce in an invalid instrument or indeed actively fabricate
such an instrument, thereby defeating the interests of their creditors. If the
creditors are not allowed to contest the probate of the will, they would have no
remedy at all against the defrauding heirs."3 Second, the court conceded the
premise that a testator has a right to dispose of his property as he sees fit; but
the issue here is whether the heirs can make the will for the testator or settle
property in a proceeding that will adjudge a false document to be a true one. 4
Third, although the creditors of an heir may not have an actual property interest
in the estate, the court nonetheless concluded that they were proper parties to
contest since it is "... . not merely persons who have a legal interest in the estate
27 Id. at 328, 32 A. at 1041.
28 Id. Throughout the Shepard opinion there is no distinction drawn between general
and judgment creditors. Indeed, in light of the history of the case in the lower court, it
seems that Shepard applies to judgment creditors as well as general creditors. See 11 Pa. Co.
Ct. 133 (1892).
29 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) at 265 (1834).
30 The Kentucky Supreme Court granted standing to both general and judgment creditors
first in Brooks v. Paine's Ex'rs, 123 Ky. 271, 90 S.W. 600 (1906) and later in Mullins v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 30 Ky. L. Rptr. 1077, 100 S.W. 256 (1907).
31 123 Ky. 271, 90 S.W. 600 (1906).
32 Id. at 273, 90 S.W. at 600.
33 Id. at 274, 90 S.W. at 600.
34 Id. at 275, 90 S.W. at 601.
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of the decedent, but those who have a legal interest to be affected by the probate
of his will, that are let in to contest the probate." 5
B. Rights of Judgment Creditors
While general creditors generally have no standing to contest the will, the
opposite is true as to judgment creditors.'
The earliest precedent establishing different rules for judgment creditors
than for general creditors is Smith v. Bradstreet,7 in which the caveator was a
creditor of a disinherited heir. The court held that a general creditor was not
a "person aggrieved" within the applicable statute since, first, his interest was too
contingent and remote and, second, the probate of the will could divest no prop-
erty right of the creditor.' The creditor revised his facts to state that he had
perfected a lien on the heir's property. The court held that the lien created
an appropriate real property interest which could be followed up by perfect
title and that probate of the will could divest this right. The lien creditor,
therefore, has standing. 9
In re Langevin's Wilt"0 illustrates the reasoning generally set forth by courts
in granting judgment creditors standing to contest. In that case the testator
disinherited his son. Before the decedent's death, the son's creditors recovered a
judgment and lien on all real estate the son had or might acquire. These credi-
tors wished to contest the will's validity on grounds of undue influence and lack
of capacity. The issue, of course, was whether the judgment creditors had
standing to contest, i.e., whether they were "interested persons" within the mean-
ing of the appropriate statute.41 The court stated that the interest that will en-
title one to oppose a will must be a legally recognized interest in the property
affected by probate. Furthermore, the court stated that a judgment creditor of
an heir has this interest since, if there is no valid will, the heir takes his intestate
share immediately at the testator's death, and at that point the judgment im-
mediately becomes a lien on the property in the heir's hands. Probate of the
will would divest that lien. Therefore while a general creditor lacks such requisite
interest, a judgment creditor is indeed an "interested party."42
The court in In re Duffy's Estate,4 a comprehensive case in accord with
Langevin, did not consider as material the fact that a judgment lien may not
35 Id. at 276, 90 S.W. at 601.
36 In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P.2d 992 (1951); In re Duffy's Estate,
228 Iowa 426, 292 N.W. 165 (1940); In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429, 47 N.W. 1133
(1891); Watson v. Alderson, 146 Mo. 333, 48 S.W. 478 (1898); Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin,
246 Mo. 711, 152 S.W. 38 (1912); In re Van Doren's Estate, 119 N.J.Eq. 80, 180 A. 841
(1935); In re 'Coryell's Will, 4 App. Div. 429, 39 N.Y.S. 508 (1896); Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio
46, 84 N.E. 604 (1908); Seward v. Johnson, 27 R.I. 396, 62 A. 569 (1905); Koromowski v.
Jackowski, 164 Wis. 254, 159 N.W. 912 (1916).
37 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 264 (1834).
38 Id. at 265.
39 Id. Smith v. Bradstreet was followed precisely by the recent Massachusetts case, Marcus
v. Pearce Woolen Mills, 353 Mass. 483, 233 N.E.2d 29 (1968) which confirmed the division
between creditors with liens and those without.
40 45 Minn. 429, 47 N.W. 1133 (1891).
41 Id. at 430, 47 N.W. at 1133.
42 Id.
43 228 Iowa 426, 292 N.W. 165 (1940).
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be an estate in land in the technical sense. The lien, said the court, is nonetheless
a valuable property right." The court noted that probate adjudications should
be as far reaching as possible and all persons with adverse interests should be
given an opportunity to be heard."
While the general rule is that a judgment lien creditor is an "interested
person" and a proper party to a will contest, some cases have declined even to
permit a judgment creditor to contest a will."
Lee v. Keech1' perhaps best represents the cases denying standing to judg-
ment creditors. The judgment creditor therein held a judgment lien on the
property of a disinherited son. The debtor son's intestate share had been left
to his wife and thus out of the reach of creditors. The court analyzed the ques-
tion of the judgment creditor's right to contest in terms of the nature of the
interest held by a judgment creditor of an heir and the nature of the requisite
interest to contest. The kind of interest required to contest probate must be
"... such an interest gained in the property as will give the creditor a part of
the sum total rights of ownership."" The court then concluded that a judgment
lien is a statutory lien which is more in the nature of a remedy than an estate.
It gives the creditor no property right or estate in the property itself, and there-
fore cannot support a caveat.49
The case law dealing with the rights of creditors of heirs is somewhat con-
fused. Many of these cases expressly reject the arguments advanced by the other
courts, and the nonspecific statutory requirements offer no help in rectifying this
confusion. Furthermore, in those jurisdictions having only old cases or no cases
at all on point, lawyers can only guess as to the state of the law.5"
IV. The Uniform Probate Code
A. Purposes of the Code
It would be anticipated that the confusion in probate law would be clari-
fied by the Uniform Probate Code,5 which had as its object the streamlining
and unifying of probate practice. In 1969, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, in response to a recognized need for change,'
adopted the Uniform Probate Code which was thereafter endorsed by the Ameri-
44 A case holding precisely the opposite is Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (1926).
See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
45 In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 458, 292 N.W. 165, 179 (1940).
46 Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996 (1899); Lee v. Keech, 151 Md. 34,
133 A. 835 (1926); Bank of Tennessee v. Nelson, 40 Tenn. (3 Head.) 436 (1859).
47 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (1926).
48 Id. at 36, 133 A. at 836.
49 Id.
50 A survey of the cases indicates that the states having decided the question break down
into the following categories: first, the states which allow no creditors of an heir to contest
are Alabama, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee; second, the states which allow only
judgment creditors to contest are California, Iowa, Massachusetts, .Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Rhode Island; third, the only state whch allows all creditors of
an heir to contest is Kentucky.
51 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1969).
52 During the 1960's many states undertook the task of reforming the often cumbersome
process of probate. Public discontent with the probate system was manifested by the popularity
of DA nY, How TO Avoma PROBATE! (1965).
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can Bar Association. The purposes of the Code are, first, to provide a simple,
efficient, and flexible means of settling estates with a minimum of court inter-
ference or supervision" and, second, to provide uniformity of probate practice
among the states.
By spring 1974, a number of states had adopted the Code;5" it is presently
being discussed before the legislatures of a number of other states. One com-
mentator predicts that by the end of the decade the Uniform Probate Code will
be to probate law what the Uniform Commercial Code is to commercial law.5
Due to the great interest in the Code it is important that it be widely discussed
and criticized.56
B. The Right to Contest the Will
In analyzing the Uniform Probate Code provisions covering the right to
contest the will, it is important to keep in mind the purposes of the Code and
to determine whether the provisions implement these purposes.
Section 3-105"T of the Code provides that "persons interested in decedents'
estates" may apply for determination in informal probate proceedings and may
petition the court for formal proceedings. Section 3-401" specifically states that
formal testacy proceedings may be commenced by an "interested person." Sec-
tion 1-201 (20) defines the phrase "interested person":
"Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries and any others having a property right in or claim against a
trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward or protected person which may
be affected by the proceeding. It also includes persons having priority for
appointment as personal representative, and other fiduciaries representing
interested persons. The meaning as it relates to particular persons may
53 E.g., see UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-101 et seq.
54 States enacting or substantially modeling their probate codes after the Uniform Probate
Code by spring 1974 are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, and North Dakota.
55 Kossow, Probate Law and the Uniform Code: "One for the Money . . A" 61 GEO. L. J.
1357, (1973).
56 See generally the following discussions of the 'Code: Curry, West Virginia and the
Uniform Probate Code: An Overview, 76 W. VA'. L. RIv. 111 (1974); Fratcher, Missouri and
the Uniform Probate Code, 26 Mo. B. J. 349 (1970); Fratcher, Estate Planning and Admin-
istration under the Uniform Probate Code, 110 TRuSTS & ESTATES 5 (1971); Kossow, Probate
Law and the Uniform Code: "One for the Money... " 61 Gno. L. J. 1357 (1973); Limbaugh,
Probate and Administration under the Uniform Probate Code, 29 Mo. B. J. 430 (1973);
McKleroy, Uniform Probate Cade: A Comparison with Existing Alabama Probate Law, 2
CUMBER-SAM. L. Rlv. 1 (1971); Stroup, Probate Practice under the Uniform Probate Code,
46 N.D. L. REv. 289 (1970); Wellman, The New Uniform Probate Code, 56 A.B.A.J. 636
(1970); Wellman, Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code: A Reaction to the Chicago
Commentary, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 536; Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate
Code, 1970 U. ILL. L. F. 413.
57 Section 3-105 provides in part: "Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to
the Registrar for determination in the informal proceedings provided in this Article, and may
petition the Court for orders in formal proceedings within the Court's jurisdiction including
but not limited to those described in this Article."
58 Section 3-401 provides in part: "A formal testacy proceeding is litigation to determine
whether a decedent left a valid will. A formal testacy proceeding may be commenced by an
interested person filing a petition as described in Section 3-402 (a) in which he requests that
the Court, after notice and hearing, enter an order probating a will, or a petition to set aside
an informal probate of a will or to prevent informal probate of a will which is the subject
of a pending application, or a petition in accordance with Section 3-402(b) for an order that
the decedent died intestate."
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vary from time to time and must be determined according to the particular
purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.
Upon analysis it will be seen that the § 1-201(20) definition gives no
answer to the question of whether a creditor of a disinherited heir is an "in-
terested person." All the enumerated persons in the first sentence stand in a
definite relation to the decedent. For example, the word "heirs" clearly means
heirs of the decedent. Likewise the word "devisees" clearly means devisees of
the decedent. It follows that the word "creditors," as used in the same enumer-
ation, also must mean creditors of the decedent. A creditor of a decedent,
of course, is a proper party to any will proceeding since he is to be satisfied out
of the estate. But, as mentioned previously, a decedent's creditors are never
proper parties to contest a will since their interests are satisfied whether the will
is valid or not. The crucial point, however, is that the word "creditors" as used
here gives no guidance about the right of the creditor of a disinherited heir to
contest. Indeed, there is no guidance on the question throughout § 1-201 (20);
the last sentence of that section perpetuates the ambiguity.
The provisions of the Code do not, therefore, adequately clarify the right
of a creditor of an heir to contest a will; this very ambiguity conflicts with the
purposes of the Code. One purpose of the Code, it will be recalled, is to provide
a simple, flexible, and efficient system of estate settlement. This purpose is hardly
served by a Code whose ambiguity begs litigation on the very issue of standing.
Another purpose of the Code is uniformity. The Code's silence on an issue
which has already been decided inconsistently in various jurisdictions is hardly
the path toward uniformity of interpretation.
The situation reduces to this: The case law conflicts as to rights of creditors
of heirs; past statutory requirements for standing to contest have not provided
adequate clarity; and the Uniform Probate Code's definition of "interested
persons" is ambiguous on creditors' rights.
V. Analysis and Resolution
How should the next case concerning the right of a creditor of an heir to
contest a will be decided? If the case is in a state having adopted the Code,
how should the Code be interpreted? How should the Code or state statutes be
changed in advance to preclude further litigation on this troublesome question?"'
A. Response to Allowing No Creditor to Contest
Various arguments have been advanced for the position that no creditor
of an heir should have the right to contest the will. Lee v. Keech6° dismissed
all creditor contests on the ground that the creditor of an heir does not have
a genuine estate in the property of the deceased and therefore the creditor's
interest is not "part of the sum total rights of ownership." 1 This is precisely
59 On the right of creditors of heirs to contest the will see the sources collected note 8
supra.
60 151 Md. 34, 133 A. 835 (1926).
61 Id. at 36, 133 A. at 836.
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the type of reasoning rejected in In re Duffy's Estate as ".... attaching too much
importance to quibble and technicality, and overlooking the common sense of
the situation." 2 Other courts in similar circumstances have found it equally
easy to decide that at least a judgment creditor with a lien has a sufficiently
substantial interest in the property to be a "person interested" in the proceed-
ings.6" The ease with which courts disagree makes it apparent that arguments
based on a property interest theory are more in the nature of assertions than
reasonable foundations for a court's decision.
Another argument advanced for the position that no creditor of an heir
should have standing is that to allow any creditor of an heir to contest presents
the problem of a creditor with a small claim indefinitely tying up a large estate,
thus depriving those to be benefitted under the will from receiving their be-
quests.64 This reasonable fear, however, could be alleviated by a state's enact-
ment of a statute requiring that a claim be of a certain amount before granting
a creditor standing. Or, rather than a designated amount, perhaps it would be
more just to have a formula determination for deciding when to give a creditor
standing. This formula could include the size of the estate, the wealth of those
to be benefitted under the will, and the solvency of the debtor heir, as well as
the amount of the creditor's claim. There is no reason why, in the absence
of such a statute, a court itself could not devise such a formula. An additional
way to prevent small claims from tying up large estates would be to limit the
right to contest to judgment creditors. Allowing only judgment creditors to
contest would in effect eliminate many small claims since creditors with small
claims would not be reducing their claims to judgments with the same urgency
and frequency as those with large claims. Finally, the fear of a small claim
tying up a large estate may be entirely unfounded simply because small claimants
would not find the expense of suit worthwhile.
Another argument against letting any creditor contest is that giving credi-
tors this right would result in a flood of litigation as all creditors of all heirs
joined the proceedings.65 This problem could also be alleviated by a rule allow-
ing only judgment creditors standing; there are simply fewer judgment creditors
than general creditors. Judging from the scarcity of cases on this issue, even in
a jurisdiction allowing both judgment and general creditors to contest, it is
doubtful if the fear of a litigious deluge is realistic. 66
It has also been argued that since legatees and devisees can renounce their
interest in bequests to the detriment of their creditors,67 then, logically, a creditor
of a beneficiary should not have standing to contest an invalid will if acquiesced
in by the beneficiary.' The argument is that if the beneficiary can renounce
62 In re Duffy's Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 447, 292 N.W. 165, 174 (1940).
63 E.g., In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 242, 238 P. 2d 992 (1951); In re Duffy's
Estate, 228 Iowa 426, 292 N.W. 165 (1940); Smith v. Bradstreet, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 264
(1834).
64 In re Shepard's Estate, 170 Pa. at 328, 32 A. at 1041.
65 Id.
66 In Kentucky, the only jurisdiction allowing all creditors of heirs to contest, there have
been only two such contests. See note 30 supra.
67 See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 435 '(1947).
68 Cf. Lockard v. Stephenson, 120 Ala. 641, 24 So. 996 (1899); In re Shepard's Estate,
170 Pa. 323, 32 A. 1040 (1895).
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the bequest, he should be allowed to acquiesce in a will depriving him of a be-
quest. However, the cases generally have not been concerned with creditors of
legatees or devisees, but rather have dealt with creditors of heirs. And although
the rule is that legatees and devisees can renounce a bequest, the general rule
as to heirs is that they cannot renounce their intestate share" Therefore the
logic now runs the opposite direction: Since heirs cannot renounce their share,
they should not be allowed to acquiesce in a spurious will disinheriting them.
It should be noted that often it is not a situation of heirs merely acquiescing in
an invalid will, but rather a case of the heirs having actively procured it!
The Uniform Probate Code, however, allows all those who will take an
interest in a decedent's estate, both beneficiaries and heirs, to renounce their
interest.7" In states having adopted the Code, this alone would support the
original logic that since heirs can renounce, they should be allowed to acquiesce.
But it is questionable whether heirs or devisees or legatees could renounce their
interest when a judgment lien is held against them on the property, since § 2-
801(d) (1) bars the right to renounce if there is an "encumbrance" on the
property.71
In summary, the arguments for not allowing any creditor of an heir the
right to contest are of limited persuasive value.
B. Response to Allowing All Creditors to Contest
This discussion has discounted the arguments for allowing no creditor the
right to contest. But why, now, should not all creditors be allowed to contest?
General and judgment creditors have a similar interest insofar as the chances of
payment and satisfaction for all creditors are improved if their debtors have
more assets. 2 Additionally, since probate proceedings are usually in rem, should
not all creditors have a chance to contest a possibly fraudulent will in the only
forum available?
The persuasive considerations above, however, are countered by yet more
forceful ones. A general creditor's interest in the devolution of the estate is less
substantial than a judgment creditor's, since there is less assurance that a general
creditor will ever satisfy himself out of the estate. First, the general creditor
must reduce his claim to a judgment, and second, this must be done before the
69 See Annot., 170 A.L.R. 435 (1947).
70 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801 (a) provides in part: "A person (or his personal
representative) who is an heir, devisee, person succeeding to a renounced interest, beneficiary
under a testamentary instrument or person designated to take pursuant to a power of appoint-
ment exercised by a testamentary instrument may renounce in whole or in part the succession
to any property or interest therein by filing a written instrument within the time and at the
place hereinafter provided."
71 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d) provides in part: "Any (1) assignment, con-
veyance, encumbrance, pledge or transfer of property therein or any contract therefor, (2)
written waiver of the right to renounce or any acceptance of property by an heir, devisee,
person succeeding to a renounced interest, beneficiary or person designated to take pursuant
to a power of appointment exercised by testamentary instrument, or (3) sale or other dis-
position of property pursuant to judicial process, made before the expiration of the period in
which he is permitted to renounce, bars the right to renounce as to the property."
72 See Brooks v. Paine's Ex'rs, 123 Ky. 271, 90 S.W. 600 (1906).
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property is assigned or sold. The most convincing argument for denying general
creditors the right to contest is that their claims have not yet been proven. A
rule allowing standing to creditors with unproven claims could lead to harass-
ment. Likewise, the settlement of some estates could be held up by unfounded
claims. If general creditors were made proper contestants, the probate court
would have to determine the validity of their claims in order to avoid spurious
litigation. Thus, a court traditionally created to probate a will would have to
decide the validity of a claim. This would have adverse effects on the efficiency
of estate settlement. But more importantly, the debtor heir who does not wish
to contest the will may perhaps not even be present to dispute the claim against
him. So, while there are persuasive reasons for allowing creditors of an heir to
contest a will, there are countervailing reasons for not giving this right to general
creditors.
One case which has granted the right to contest to judgment creditors only,
however, has required additionally that the judgment creditor have a lien on
the heir's property." This requirement is unnecessary and illogical. First, since
a lien attaches to realty but not personalty, a lien requirement would have the
anomalous result of allowing a judgment creditor standing when the estate con-
tains realty but not when it contains only personalty. This distinction makes
no sense. Second, if the judgment had been docketed in a county other than the
one where the probate proceedings were held, the lien would not be effective
on real estate in the county of the probate court. Thus the standing of a judg-
ment creditor would turn on the precise location of the property, which also
appears to make little sense.
VI. Conclusion
The conclusion emerging from the preceding analysis is that the best rule
would be one which allows judgment creditors of disinherited debtor heirs the
right to challenge the probate of a will, whether or not such creditor has per-
fected a lien. This rule should apply both to those states which have adopted
the Uniform Probate Code and those which have not. However, the preferable
solution would be to amend the Code in accordance with this conclusion in
order to preclude further litigation on this issue. Such clarification would be a
sensible step toward efficiency and uniformity, and thus make the application
of the Code congruent with its purposes.
James R. Hellige
73 In re Harootenian's Estate, 38 'Cal. 2d 242, 238 P. 2d 992 (1951).
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